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DANGEROUS CLASSROOM “APP”-TITUDE:
PROTECTING STUDENT PRIVACY FROM THIRD-PARTY
EDUCATIONAL SERVICE PROVIDERS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Kate, an eleven-year-old middle school student, is told by
her teachers to bring a mobile device to class1 so she can
engage in interactive teaching lessons during class through a
free mobile application called “Take With Me Learning,” which
tracks students’ progress throughout the semester.2 The mobile
application requires the student to create a profile consisting of
personal information including school, teacher, age, name, and
email address.3 Once the student has access, he or she can
1 This would be considered a type of “Bring Your Own Device” (BYOD)
program, which allows students to bring their own laptops, tablets, cellphones, and
other mobile devices in order to access certain activities, such as cloud-computing
services and mobile applications, provided at school. See Getting Started with BYOD,
K–12 BLUEPRINT (2014), https://www.k12blueprint.com/sites/default/files/GettingStarted-BYOD.pdf. Khan Academy is one common mobile application schools use to
improve learning and gauge a student’s progress. See infra note 8.
2 See Beyond the Fear Factor: Parental Support for Technology and Data Use in
Schools, FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM 4 (Sept. 2015), https://fpf.org/wpcontent/uploads/Beyond-the-Fear-Factor_Sept2015.pdf [hereinafter Beyond the Fear
Factor] (stating that online services may be used by schools “to manage grades,
attendance, class assignments, bus routes, school lunch programs, special education
services, counseling, standardized testing, and the myriad other functions they provide
on a continuous basis.”). The most common Internet practices include the use of cloudcomputing programs, online textbooks, and mobile applications. Cloud computing, or
storing data “in the cloud,” provides a school with Internet-based email, word
processing, and spreadsheet programs, allowing for anytime, anywhere access by the
students, teachers, and administrators. Steve Mutkoski, Cloud Computing, Regulatory
Compliance, and Student Privacy: A Guide for School Administrators and Legal
Counsel, 30 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 511, 512–15 (2014). Such
platforms include Microsoft, Google, Edmodo, Amazon, and IBM. Id. at 515–16. Schools
also use cloud-based services for language tools, online textbooks, and online tutoring.
Id. at 516.
3 According to a 2012 FTC study of mobile applications and children, 89.75% of
applications were intended for children in elementary school and younger. FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION, MOBILE APPS FOR KIDS: CURRENT PRIVACY DISCLOSURES ARE
DISAPPOINTING
6
(Feb.
2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/mobile-apps-kids-currentprivacy-disclosures-are-disappointing/120216mobile_apps_kids.pdf. In addition, “over
75% of the apps that specified an age range specified one ending at 12 years old or
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watch tutorials, take quizzes, play educational games,
participate in forums, and access online textbooks.4 The teacher
can monitor the students’ progress as they take various quizzes
and complete certain tasks. The teacher can also view the
questions students post on the forum.
At the beginning of the school year, Kate’s teacher sends
consent forms home with the children. These forms ask parents
to give consent for any online activity their child might engage
in throughout the year. The forms state that the parents will
allow their child to access websites and applications, such as
“Take With Me Learning,” for any educational purposes
approved by the school. Kate’s mother signs the form and
returns it. Three months later, Kate’s mother discovers from
watching the news that the “Take With Me Learning”
application Kate’s class uses is the product of a company wellknown for violating collection and privacy laws. The company
has been illegally collecting students’ information, selling it to
advertisers, and making it accessible without limitation. Upset
that Kate’s information may be subject to identity theft,
tracking, and targeted advertising, Kate’s mother contacts the
school and claims that the school failed to inform her of the
“Take With Me Learning” producer’s practices and reputation.
She claims the school has violated not only Kate’s privacy but
also her own right as a parent to control access to her child’s
interactions.
In response, the school references the consent form and
explains that under the Child Online Privacy Protection Act

younger . . . .” Id. at 7. Mobile applications have become a concern for parents because
they contain advertisements, which fund the application to allow the user access for
free or at a low cost. Joanna Tudor, Legal Implications of Using Digital Technology in
Public Schools: Effects on Privacy, 44 J.L. & EDUC. 287, 311 (2015). The operators of
these applications collect the user’s data and sell it to marketing agencies, many times
without the user’s knowledge. Id. The data collected generally “includes phone and
email contacts, call logs, Internet data, calendar data, data about the device’s location,
the device’s unique IDs and information about how the user engages with the app
itself.” Id.
4 Online textbooks contain hyperlinks to different websites, videos, and
homework help sites that may not be covered by the online textbook website’s own
privacy disclosures and policies. See DIGITAL TEXTBOOKS IN K–12 SCHOOLS, OFFICE OF
RESEARCH AND EDUCATION ACCOUNTABILITY, TENNESSEE COMPTROLLER OF THE
TREASURY,
JUSTIN
P.
WILSON
(Oct.
2013),
http://www.comptroller.tn.gov/Repository/RE/Digital%20Textbooks.pdf.
Online
textbooks do create risks, however, with the compromise of young children’s data and
personal information, and also for the loss of parents’ ability to exercise control over
their child’s interactions. Tudor, supra note 3, at 327.
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(COPPA) it is the responsibility of “Take With Me Learning,”
not the school, to obtain parental consent when dealing with
children under thirteen. Kate’s mother contacts the school
board and asks why the school was allowed to circumvent her
consent when dealing with a third-party operator like “Take
With Me Learning.” She wants to know 1) why the school did
not inform her of the application producer’s informationcollection practices and obtain her consent before engaging
with her child, and 2) why “Take With Me Learning” did not
take measures to ensure that the consent the school provided
was verifiable.
Contracting with third parties has become increasingly
common in present-day elementary and middle schools.5 Those
who qualify as third-party operators under COPPA’s
regulations make up a considerably large group.6 School
districts enter into agreements with such operators, who may
generally be categorized as website and application service
providers, to deliver services such as Google Apps for
Education7 and Khan Academy8 to schools. Even though such
applications facilitate a more efficient organizational structure
5 See Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene, Who is Reading Whom Now: Privacy in
Education from Books to MOOCs, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 927, 929–31 (2015); PBS
NewsHour: Why Digital Education Could Be A Double-Edged Sword (PBS television
broadcast Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/videos/#176786 (discussing the
privacy concerns in Miami, Florida classrooms as teachers begin to use more online
applications and the harms that are present).
6 COPPA defines an “operator” as “any person who operates a website located
on the Internet or an online service and who collects or maintains personal information
. . . for commercial purposes.” 15 U.S.C. §6501(2)(A) (1998).
7 Google Apps for Education is a service provided by Google “in the cloud” to
educational institutions. The service offers email, calendar, and chat, as well as
interactive services like Google Drive, Classroom, Docs, Slides, Sites, Hangouts, etc.
See
The
Google
Apps
for
Education
Core
Services,
GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/edu/products/productivity-tools (last visited Sept. 12, 2016);
Google
Apps
for
Education:
Common
Questions,
GOOGLE,
https://support.google.com/a/answer/139019?hl=en (last visited Feb. 12, 2016). Unlike a
personal account with Google, Google Apps for Education prohibits advertising, offers
24/7 support, has enhanced security features, and provides full administration of all
user accounts. Id. See also Google for Education: Privacy & Security Information Tools
Schools Can Trust, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/edu/trust/#does-google-ownschool-or-student-data (last visited Feb. 12, 2016) (addressing privacy and privacy law
compliance concerns, including a statement that Google Apps for Education
contractually requires schools to get the parental consent required by COPPA).
8 KHAN ACADEMY, https://www.khanacademy.org/about (last visited Feb. 12,
2016) (“Khan Academy offers practice exercises, instructional videos, and a
personalized learning dashboard . . . . [Khan Academy’s] math missions guide learners
from kindergarten to calculus using state-of-the-art, adaptive technology that identifies
strengths and learning gaps.”).
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for teachers and administrators and provide students with
beneficial interactive learning, the practice of contracting with
third-party operators raises privacy concerns and creates the
possibility of substantial harm to the children who use these
operators’ products.9
Three substantial risks exist in online classroom
interactions between young students and third-party operators:
illegal data collection, susceptibility to criminal activity, and
identity theft caused by hacking. Firstly and most notably,
opening the door for operators in the classroom creates the risk
of illegal data collection and dissemination from both
advertisers and criminals.10 In order to reach larger audiences,
advertisers utilize multiple techniques to track a user’s
behavior and gain insight that will assist in advertisement
placement on that user’s browser.11 Such techniques include
tracking activity through a device’s IP address, tracking search
terms entered into a search engine, and using “cookies” to
retain a user’s information.12 Tracking a student’s activity in
such a manner can be particularly dangerous when the
operator can collect personal information such as name,
address, or location—when a student either inputs that
information to create an account for a service or uses a service
to perform research.13 While such collection by advertisers is a

9 See Tudor, supra note 3, at 306–30 (2015); Lauren A. Matecki, Update:
COPPA is Ineffective Legislation! Next Steps for Protecting Youth Privacy Rights in the
Social Networking Era, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y. 369, 374 (2010); Stephanie Simon,
Data
Mining
Your
Children,
POLITICO
(Mar.
16,
2016),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/05/data-mining-your-children-106676_Page2.html
(last visited Oct. 16, 2016).
10 Tudor, supra note 3, at 306–30. Concern has grown in recent years as
operators increase their use of passive collection methods. Matecki, supra note 9, at
388. Matecki also quotes that a serious concern for child privacy exists because of “‘the
vulnerability of children,’ (2) ‘the immediacy and ease with which information can be
collected from them,’ and (3) ‘the ability of the online medium to circumvent the
traditional gatekeeping role of the parent.’” Id. at 374 (quoting FTC, FILE NO.
954,4807, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 12 (1998), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/toc.shtm).
11 Tudor, supra note 3, at 306.
12 Id. at 307–10.
13 Id. at 311–12 (addressing the ways that applications used in schools collect
personal information from students and the harms that this creates for the
unsuspecting student). Collection of personal information may also include a student’s
daily interests—for example, a math program used in Miami’s iPrep Academy creates
customized lessons by gathering student interests (ranging from favorite foods to the
names of their friends) to include in future math problems. PBS NewsHour, supra note
5, beginning at 1:13.
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business practice, legislation exists that makes this collection
illegal when the operator collects personal information from a
child under the age of thirteen without parental consent.14
Secondly, the child’s information could be compromised
through criminal activity.15 Criminal activity could include
activities such as identity fraud, harassment, and stalking.16
One recent example includes the 2014 case of United States v.
Rhim-Grant, in which the defendants (food service managers in
Miami-Dade County Public Schools) used their access to the
school computer database to steal approximately four hundred
student social security numbers, resulting in numerous
fraudulent tax returns.17 In this particular case, the
information was stolen by individuals who were part of the
school’s network; however, as schools contract more frequently
with third-party online service providers, schools and their
students become more susceptible to such criminal activity.
A third major concern is that school databases can be
hacked, which can lead to identity theft.18 Hackers have
targeted universities in search of students’ names, birthdates,
and social security numbers.19 While K–12 school districts have
not yet had major problems with this type of hacking, young
students may be more susceptible as they participate in
classroom educational applications, not only because these
grades use applications from third-party operators with
increasing frequency, but also because children lack full
knowledge of the potential harm they invite by entering their

14 15 U.S.C. §6502(a) (1998) (prohibiting an operator of a website or online
service directed to children or knowingly used by children to collect the child’s personal
information).
15 See Tudor, supra note 3, at 325–330.
16 Id. at 325.
17 PBS NewsHour, supra note 5, beginning at 4:57; Press Release, FBI: Miami
Division, Twenty-Five Defendants Charged in Separate Schemes That Resulted in
Thousands of Identities Stolen and Millions of Dollars in Identity Theft Tax Filings
(April 3, 2014), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/miami/press-releases/2014/twenty-fivedefendants-charged-in-separate-schemes-that-resulted-in-thousands-of-identitiesstolen-and-millions-of-dollars-in-identity-theft-tax-filings. Frank Maderal, Assistant
United States Attorney assigned to the Rhim-Grant case, stated that all the defendant
had to do was “login, access the information, print it out.” PBS NewsHour, supra note
5, beginning at 5:30.
18 Tudor, supra note 3, at 327.
19 Id. (citing an FTC report on child identity theft). See also Simon, supra note 9
(citing an incident at the University of Maryland where nearly three hundred thousand
students, faculty, and staff had their personal information, including social security
number, stolen).
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personal information online.
In order to protect young students from these dangers and
ensure compliance with COPPA at school, the law must ask
who is responsible for ensuring that the students’ personal
information remains safe—the school or the third-party
operator? Because COPPA does not apply directly to schools as
entities,20 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued
guidance in 2015, creating a “school exception.”21 This
exception allows schools to give permission to third-party
operators in place of parents, so long as it is given strictly for
educational purposes.22 However, it also becomes a question of
whether federal action is adequate or whether state action is
also required. Federal legislation like COPPA fails to
adequately protect young students, and its language generates
confusion about which third-party operators must follow
regulations for online privacy and who is at risk for sanctions if
they don’t comply. States lacking protection should therefore
create their own legislation targeting classroom interactions
between students and third-party operators to ensure that
student personal data is kept private and not subject to outside
collection and dissemination.
This Comment addresses concerns and tensions between
COPPA and the school system and proposes a more
comprehensive solution at the state level. COPPA itself does
not apply to a school as an entity; but as technology improves
and infiltrates the classroom, young students will continue to
need COPPA’s protection. Due to the FTC’s lack of COPPA
enforcement, some states have begun to create their own
school-specific legislation to increase protection for their
students while interacting online. Allowing illegal collection of
data without proper consent to go virtually unmonitored
creates a high risk of harm to a child. Therefore, this Comment

20 15 U.S.C. § 6501(2) (1998) (defining operators as having commercial
purposes). See also Lesley Fair, Testing: A Review Session on COPPA and Schools,
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
(Jan.
23,
2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/business-blog/2015/01/testing-testing-review-session-coppa-schools
(“Schools—which are usually part of the local government—don’t fall within the legal
definition of who’s covered by COPPA because they aren’t commercial ‘operators.’”).
21 A Guide for Business And Parents And Small Entity Compliance Guide,
Federal Trade Commission M1 (Mar. 20, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/business-center/guidance/complying-coppa-frequently-asked-questions#Schools
[hereinafter 2015 Guidance].
22 Id.
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argues that all states should proactively create legislation
governing classroom interactions between students and thirdparty operators.
Part II of this Comment examines COPPA’s legislative
history and its requirements, as well as how lack of
enforcement has rendered COPPA’s application to schools
unclear and unworkable. Further, this section compares
COPPA to current federal student-data legislation and recent
federal attempts at classroom-oriented agency rules and
legislation, concluding that reform at the state level is the most
effective in ensuring that young students’ privacy is not
compromised through the illegal collection of personal
information.
Part III explains and critiques the gap between COPPA’s
protection and the school system, focusing on the confusing and
inefficient consent requirements that both schools and thirdparty operators can circumvent under FTC regulation as it
stands. It argues that allowing a school to obtain blanket
“verifiable parental consent” is dangerous because (a) it is
difficult for the online operator to authenticate the consent
given by the school, and (b) it is unclear who specifically within
the school can give the consent in lieu of parents. Further,
because states seek greater protection and transparency in
online dealings for their students, Part III also provides
examples of states, such as California, Washington, Utah, and
Delaware, that have begun creating student-data legislation to
address student and third-party-operator interactions in the
classroom. It urges that the remaining states do the same—
particularly by adopting a dual prohibitive/governance
approach (an approach that encompasses both express
prohibitions and methods of oversight for schools to ensure
compliance).
Part IV offers both prohibitive- and governance-based
provisions states should consider when writing new studentdata legislation. Lastly, Part V concludes.
II.

COPPA: BACKGROUND AND PROBLEMS CREATED
A. Legislative History and Reasons for Enactment

By 1998 the personal computer had become a basic tool not
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only at work, but also in the home and at school.23 According to
the 1997 census, 74.4% of children ages three to seventeen had
access to a computer, and 22.6% of these children had used the
Internet.24 With computer and Internet use on the rise among
some of society’s youngest members, Congress found that
protecting such students’ personal information became a
priority. The FTC determined in 1998 that “children lack the
developmental capacity and judgment to give meaningful
consent to the release of personal information to a third
party”25—a child may disclose such information in order to
engage in online activity without fully understanding the
consequences.26 “Before 1998, no federal law restricted
collection of personal information from children online.”27 In
fact, according to a survey conducted by the FTC that year,
89% of websites directed at children collected personal
information from them, with only 23% of websites requesting
parental consent from parents for this collection.28
Such collection practices by website operators caused some
people to be wary of Internet use for children.29 Ninety-seven
percent of parents expressed concerns about their children’s
personal information being shared with third parties.30
Congress found that interactions presented to minors while on
the Internet “frustrate parental . . . control,” that protection of
minors on the Internet “is a compelling government interest,”
and that offering defenses for minors is the “least restrictive
means” of protecting their privacy on the Internet.31 As a
result, Congress adopted Senator Richard Bryan’s COPPA bill
to advance the following goals:
(1) [T]o enhance parental involvement in a child’s online
23 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPUTER USE IN THE UNITED STATES: POPULATION
CHARACTERISTICS 1 (1997), http://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/p20-522.pdf (stating
that “36.6% [of American households] had computers,” which was “up substantially
from 22.8% in 1993, 15.0% in 1989, and 8.2% in 1984.”).
24 Id. at 3.
25 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 5 (1998)
[hereinafter 1998 FTC REPORT].
26 See Matecki, supra note 9, at 374.
27 David R. Hostetler & Seiko F. Okada, Children’s Privacy in Virtual K-12
Education: Virtual Solutions of the Amended Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA) Rule, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 167, 176 (2013).
28 1998 FTC REPORT, supra note 25, at iii.
29 Id. at 3.
30 Id. at 37.
31 Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, Part III (1998).
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activities in order to protect the privacy of children in the
online environment; (2) to enhance parental involvement to
help protect the safety of children in online fora such as
chatrooms, home pages, and pen-pal services in which
children may make public postings of identifying information;
(3) to maintain the security of personally identifiable
information of children collected online; and (4) to protect
children’s privacy by limiting the collection of personal
information from children without parental consent. The
legislation accomplishes these goals in a manner that
preserves the interactivity of children’s experience on the
Internet and preserves children’s access to information in this
rich and valuable medium.32

Congress enacted COPPA33 to regulate the online collection,
use, and disclosure of personal information of children under
the age of thirteen.34
B. COPPA Standards and Requirements
In its latest form (FTC rule passed in 2013), COPPA
protects a range of personal information: name, address, Social
Security number, photograph, video, and geolocation
information.35 COPPA applies to two parties: (a) operators of
commercial websites and online services directed at children
and (b) operators of general audience websites and online
services who have actual knowledge that they are collecting
personal information from children.36 Before an operator may
undertake such activities, it must provide notice to parents and
receive verifiable parental consent.37
However, the statute recognizes that situations exist in
which less parental consent is necessary; thus it adopts a
144 Cong. Rec. S11657 (Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Sen. Bryan).
The Child Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (1998)
(effective in 2000).
34 Id.
35 See 16 C.F.R. §312.2 (2013).
36 15 U.S.C. §6502(a)(1).
37 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A). “Verifiable parental consent” is defined as:
32
33

[A]ny reasonable effort (taking into consideration available technology), including
a request for authorization for future collection, use, and disclosure described in
the notice, to ensure that a parent of a child receives notice of the operator’s
personal information collection, use, and disclosure practices, and authorizes the
collection, use, and disclosure, as applicable, of personal information and the
subsequent use of that information before that information is collected from that
child.

15 U.S.C. § 6501(9).
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“sliding scale”38 when determining requirements for parental
consent. COPPA does not require verifiable parental consent
when the online contact is on a “one-time basis,” for the sole
purpose of providing notice to a parent and receiving consent,
for protection of the child’s safety, or as required by law.39 For
example, a third-party operator does not need to provide notice
or obtain verifiable parental consent when responding to a onetime email request from a child where the child’s email is
promptly deleted after issuing a response.40 However, an
operator must provide notice to parents and an opportunity to
opt out when allowing a child to subscribe to periodic
interactions such as email newsletters and must obtain full
parental consent in situations where children can post or share
personal information publicly.41 Any personal information that
has been collected for these one-time interactions may be kept
only for as long as necessary to fulfill the operator’s purpose.42
Afterward, the operator must delete the child’s information
using reasonable measures.43 Because the law allows for
situations where parental consent is not required, the key to
ensuring compliance is enforcement.44
The FTC is the governing body that regulates and enforces
COPPA.45 It has the full authority to treat violations in the
same manner as other rules defining unfair and deceptive acts
or practices under the Federal Trade Commission Act.46 An
operator who violates COPPA may face civil penalties up to

38 Matecki, supra note 9, at 377–78; see also 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b); COPPA +1:
Issues and Impacts For Children’s Privacy, KELLER AND HECKMAN LLP (Sept. 11,
2014).
39 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(2).
40 2015 Guidance, supra note 21, at (H)(2); COPPA +1: Issues and Impacts For
Children’s Privacy, supra note 38.
41 COPPA +1: Issues and Impacts For Children’s Privacy, supra note 38.
42 16 C.F.R. § 312.10.
43 Id.
44 See Hostetler & Okada, supra note 27, at 188–89.
45 15 U.S.C. § 6505(a) (stating that this title is to be enforced by the commission
under the Federal Trade Commission Act). The FTC must create regulations to ensure
parents receive proper notice and opportunity to give parental consent; to provide
parents with the opportunity to review the child’s information and the opportunity to
prevent further use of the child’s personal information; to limit a website’s collection of
the child’s personal information; and to establish procedures to protect the
confidentiality and security of the child’s information. 2 Fed. Trade Comm’n. § 20:15
(2015); 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1) (listing the requirements for the regulations to be
imposed by the FTC).
46 15 U.S.C. § 57(a)(1)(B); 15 U.S.C. § 6504(a)(1).
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$16,000 per violation.47 In determining the amount of civil
penalties, courts consider the “egregiousness of the violations,
whether the operator has previously violated the Rule, the
number of children involved, the amount and type of personal
information collected, how the information was used, whether
it was shared with third parties, and the size of the company.”48
In addition, any state attorney general may bring a civil action
on behalf of its residents.49
However, even with such measures established by law, the
FTC has not effectively enforced them.50 As of January 1, 2015,
only twenty-four COPPA actions had been filed.51 In addition,
only three states—New Jersey, Texas, and Maryland—had
successfully brought enforcement actions.52
C. Problems with COPPA Enforcement
Since its enactment, COPPA has faced criticism for both its
ineffectiveness and its improper enforcement.53 Even though
COPPA initially seemed to work after its first FTC review in
2002, with more than 90% of children’s websites meeting the
necessary disclosure requirement, it has not generated
resounding success with websites not specifically directed at
children under the age of thirteen.54 The statute’s vague
language has rendered it difficult for website operators to avoid
violations.55 One of the main criticisms directed at COPPA
involves the ability of a child to falsify his or her age, tricking
the operator into believing it is in compliance with COPPA
2015 Guidance, supra note 21, at (B)(2).
Id.
49 15 U.S.C. § 6504(a)(1).
50 See COPPA +1: Issues and Impacts For Children’s Privacy, supra note 38;
Matecki, supra note 9.
51 Richard A. Chapo, List of COPPA FTC Enforcement Cases, COPPA AND
FERPA: COPPA AND FERPA LEGAL ADVICE (Feb. 3, 2015).
52 Id.; see also Maryland Attorney General, Attorney General Gansler Secures
Settlement from Snapchat, Inc. (June 12, 2014); New Jersey Attorney General, New
Jersey Attorney General and Division of Consumer Affairs File Federal Suit Against
App Developer Accused of Collecting, Transmitting Children’s Personal Information
Without Parental Notification or Consent (June 6, 2012); Texas Attorney General,
Attorney General Abbott Takes Action Against Web Sites That Illegally Collect Personal
Information from Minors (Dec. 5, 2007).
53 See Matecki, supra note 9, at 379–87; Hostetler & Okada, supra note 27, at
181–84.
54 FTC, STAFF REPORT, Protecting Children’s Privacy Under COPPA: A Survey
On Compliance (Apr. 1st, 2002), www.ftc.gov/os/2002/04/coppasurvey.pdf.
55 Matecki, supra note 9, at 379.
47
48
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when in fact it is in violation and thus subject to fine.56 Only
fourteen federal actions were filed from 1999 to 2014, including
actions against Lisa Frank, Inc. (2001); Hershey Food Corp.
(2003); Xanga.com, Inc. (2006); Sony BMG Music
Entertainment (2008); and Yelp, Inc. (2014).57 With technology
and online interaction capabilities continually on the rise,
especially in the classroom, the likelihood of further COPPA
violations is inevitable.
D. Application of COPPA in Schools and the “School
Exception”
One of COPPA’s perceived shortcomings is its
inapplicability to schools. While COPPA protection applies to
the privacy of children under the age of thirteen, it does not
directly apply to schools as entities.58 Thus, a gap exists
between the protection of a child’s privacy at home and a child’s
privacy while at school.
Unlike other federal legislation, COPPA deals strictly with
interactions between children under thirteen and online
operators. Its purpose is to protect children regardless of the
setting. In application, COPPA requires that before a thirdparty operator authorizes a child under thirteen to use its
website and services, it must provide notice and obtain
verifiable parental consent.59 However, operators contracted
within the school setting must provide such notice directly to
the school, not to the parent.60 Additionally, but only upon
request from the school, the operator must provide a
description of the types of information collected, an opportunity
to prevent further use or collection of the child’s personal
information, and the opportunity to review the child’s personal
information submitted and/or have it deleted.61 Thus, notice
provided to schools allows the schools to decide whether to
56 Id. at 382–83. COPPA requires that an operator have “actual knowledge” that
it is collecting personal information from a child in order to be in violation. 15 U.S.C. §
6502(a)(1).
57 Chapo, supra note 51.
58 15 U.S.C. § 6501(2).
59 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A).
60 2015 Guidance, supra note 21, at (M)(1) (stating that the operator must
provide the school with all the notices required under COPPA). However, the FTC also
recommends that the schools consider making the notice available to parents as best
practice. Id.
61 Id.
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contract with each specific operator for educational services.
The FTC draws a distinction for when an operator may rely
on the school’s consent in lieu of parental consent. If the
operator collects the child’s data solely for the use and benefit of
the school, consent given by the school is sufficient.62 This
school exception is based on the policy rationale that “school
officials already act on behalf of the students’ best interests
and well-being when arranging and delivering their education
in non-virtual context.”63 However, if the operator collects and
uses the child’s information for commercial purposes, then
parental consent must be obtained.64 The FTC states, “[a]s long
as the operator limits use of the child’s information to the
educational context authorized by the school, the operator can
presume that the school’s authorization is based on the school’s
having obtained the parent’s consent.”65 It further advises,
“Where an operator gets consent from the school rather than
the parent, the operator’s method must be reasonably
calculated, in light of available technology, to ensure that a
school is actually providing consent, and not a child pretending
to be a teacher, for example.”66 While other federal protections
do exist to protect a student’s data at school, they do not offer
the same protections as COPPA, leaving children under the age
of thirteen vulnerable while engaging with third-party
operators at school.
1. The inadequacy of current federal student data legislation
The most widely known federal student data privacy law is
the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).67
FERPA covers elementary, secondary, and post-secondary
school students.68 However, FERPA is narrow—limited to the
62 Id. at (M)(2) (“Where a school has contracted with an operator to collect
personal information from students for the use and benefit of the school, and for no
other commercial purpose, the operator is not required to obtain consent directly from
parents . . . .”).
63 Hostetler & Okada, supra note 27, at 198.
64 2015 Guidance, supra note 21, at (M)(2). For the collection of a child’s
information for commercial purposes, some methods of obtaining “verifiable parental
consent” include signed consent forms sent via mail, fax, or scan; credit/debit card
transactions; toll-free phone calls; and checking the parent’s government-issued
identification against a database of such information. Id. at (H)(4).
65 Id. at (M)(1).
66 Id. at (M)(2).
67 20 U.S.C. § 1232.
68 20 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(3) (2013).
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prohibition of the release of students’ personal information
from a school’s educational records.69 Like COPPA, FERPA
creates scenarios in which parental consent may be
circumvented.70 Since FERPA strictly governs educational
records, it does not extend to the online classroom interactions
that have become so prevalent in today’s society.
Another federal statute that addresses online privacy is the
Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment of 1978 (PPRA),71 which
protects students in grades K–12.72 Like COPPA, PPRA applies
when personal information is collected through online
interaction, and even provides a similar “school official
exception.”73 PPRA allows the third-party operator to use the
student’s personal information commercially, so long as the
proper parental consent has been obtained.74 Because PPRA
carries the same consent exceptions as COPPA, it has the same
inherent flaw—failure to provide the necessary checks to
ensure parental consent for children, especially since the
statute gives schools the ability to circumvent parental consent
for educational purposes. Neither FERPA nor PPRA is
adequate nor strict enough to address the current parental
consent gap between schools, parents, and third-party
providers to ensure a child’s protection. Therefore, change must
be made at the state level.

69 Id. at (b)(1). An “educational record” includes “records, files, documents, and
other materials which (i) contain information directly related to a student; and (ii) are
maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for such
agency or institution.” Id. at (a)(4). Under FERPA, parents retain the right to review
and amend their child’s education records until the child reaches eighteen years old or
reaches a post-secondary institution. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d). FERPA requires parental
consent be given before any personal information or information found within the
educational record is shared. Id. at (b)(1).
70 Under the “school official exception,” the school may disclose information
without prior consent to other school officials or vendors who perform a function for the
school that would otherwise be performed by a school employee. 34 C.F.R. §
99.31(a)(1)(i)(A)–(B) (2011). The vendor must have a legitimate educational interest in
the data, and the school must be in direct control of the vendor’s use and maintenance
of the data. Id. at (a)(1)(ii).
71 20 U.S.C. § 1232(h).
72 20 U.S.C. § 1232h(c)(6)(F) (2012).
73 The exception allows the school to circumvent parental consent when the
personal information collection is for the “exclusive purpose of developing, evaluating,
or providing educational products or services . . . .” Id. at (c)(4)(A).
74 PPRA requires that schools notify parents, obtain consent, and offer an optout opportunity before allowing the child to engage in any online “collection, disclosure,
or use of personal information collected from students for the purpose of marketing or
for selling that information.” Id. at (c)(2) and (c)(1)(E) (2012).
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2. Recent COPPA concerns and changes: The 2013 FTC rule
and federal legislative attempts
In the fifteen years COPPA has been in effect, it has faced
numerous reform attempts at the federal level via legislation
and agency action. In 2013 the FTC successfully promulgated a
rule that provides children with greater privacy as well as
clearer guidelines for third parties obtaining parental
consent.75 While the FTC’s new changes do expand a child’s
privacy and provide the parent with more control, they do so in
a manner that does not improve its application in schools. This
is especially concerning as technology continues to infiltrate
every aspect of life and the lines of COPPA compliance become
blurred.
As a result, legislators in Congress have taken steps toward
expanding COPPA to the classroom.76 Generally, recent
legislative attempts have focused on expanding the age group
to cover a larger group of minors, expanding the definition of
“personal information,” and expanding the group of

75 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2013). A child’s “personal information” includes additional
persistent identifiers, such as IP address; photo, audio, or video of the child; and
geolocation. Id. at § 312.2; see also COPPA +1: Issues and Impacts For Children’s
Privacy, supra note 38. Additionally, the FTC addresses specific ways for operators to
obtain verifiable parental consent, including the new methods of approval by checking
a government-issued ID against a database, video conferences with parents, and asking
knowledge-based questions to which only a parent would have the answer. 16 C.F.R. §
312.5(b); see also COPPA +1: Issues and Impacts For Children’s Privacy, supra note 38.
These explicitly-stated methods will hopefully direct operators toward a “reasonably
calculated” method and make the process more tangible and efficient. 16 C.F.R. §
312.5; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501(9) (defining “verifiable parental consent” as “any
reasonable effort . . . to ensure that a parent of a child receives notice of the operator’s
personal collection, use, and disclosure practices, and authorizes [such uses].”). The
FTC also reigned in their “notice to parents” standard, requiring many additional
administrative and operational compliance steps to ensure correct notice is provided.
16 C.F.R. §312.4. Notice given to parents “must be clearly and understandably written,
complete, and must contain no unrelated, confusing, or contradictory materials.” Id. at
§ 312.4(b). Such compliance steps include both direct notice to parents (i.e., through the
use of hyperlinks) and notice given through the website or online service (i.e., third
party operators “must post a prominent and clearly labeled link to an online notice of
its information practices . . . .”). Id. at §312.4(c)–(d).
76 Congress considers student privacy to be an important issue to many of its
constituents, evidenced by its hundreds of attempts to pass legislation over the years.
See Tanya Roscorla, The Lowdown on Federal Student Data Privacy Legislation of
2015, CENTER FOR DIGITAL EDUCATION (July 28, 2015), [hereinafter Lowdown on
Federal Legislation 2015], http://www.centerdigitaled.com/k-12/The-Lowdown-onFederal-Student-Data-Privacy-Legislation-of-2015.html (“Over the last few years, state
legislatures have considered hundreds of student data privacy bills, and that’s shown
federal policymakers that this issue is important to their constituents.”).
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“operators.”77 Some of the most recent legislative attempts
include the Do Not Track Kids Act of 2015,78 the Student
Digital Privacy and Parental Rights Act of 2015,79 and the
Every Student Succeeds Act.80 The Do Not Track Kids Act of
2015 would expand COPPA coverage to minors between the
ages of twelve and sixteen81 and make it unlawful for operators
(including operators of websites, online services, and mobile
applications explicitly) to engage in targeted marketing
without verifiable parental consent for children or the consent
of the minor.82 It would also provide an “eraser button” for
77 See Comparison of 2015 Federal Education Data Privacy Bills, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION
OF
STATE
BOARDS
OF
EDUCATION
(July
22,
2015),
http://www.nasbe.org/wp-content/uploads/2015-Federal-Education-Data-Privacy-BillsComparison-2015.07.22-Public.pdf, [hereinafter Federal Legislation Chart] (comparing
eight different pieces of legislation introduced or passed in 2015 to FERPA and
COPPA, which demonstrates that protecting education privacy is a relevant and
important issue to Congress).
78 H.R. 2734, 114th Cong. (2015). The Do Not Track Kids Act of 2015 is most
pertinent to the collection of personal information from young children by third party
contractors in school. It was introduced by Senator Edward Markey and
Representative Joe Barton to the House on June 11, 2015, and seeks to amend COPPA
and
expand
its
coverage.
See
Summary
H.R.
2734,
CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2734; Ronald London, John D.
Seiver & Bryan Thompson, Significant Amendments to COPPA Proposed in Do Not
Track
Kids
Act,
DAVIS
WRIGHT
TREMAINE
LLP
(June
22,
2015),
http://www.privsecblog.com/2015/06/articles/marketing-and-consumerprivacy/significant-amendments-to-coppa-proposed-in-do-not-track-kids-act/.
Earlier
versions of this legislation were proposed in 2011 and 2013, but both died in committee.
See
H.R.
3481
(113th):
Do
Not
Track
Kids
Act
of
2013,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr3481; Summary H.R. 1895, 112th
Congress (2011–2012), https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/1895.
79 H.R. 2092, 114th Cong. (2015). Representatives Luke Messer and Jared Polis
introduced The Student Digital Privacy and Parental Rights Act on April 29, 2015. Id.
See also Press Release, Congressman Jared Polis, Messer, Polis Introduce Landmark
Bill to Protect Student Data Privacy: Measure Represents the Most Significant Federal
Attempt
to
Protect
Student
Data
in
Decades
(Apr.
29,
2015),
http://polis.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=397810. The Act focuses
on regulating the online providers in the K–12 classrooms, not on amending COPPA.
See Federal Legislation Chart, supra note 77, at “The Student Digital Privacy and
Parental Rights Act of 2015” column. The Act prohibits operators from collecting and
selling a student’s information to a third party for a non-school related purpose. H.R.
2092, at §3(a).
80 Every Student Succeeds Act, 114 P.L. 95, 129 Stat. 1802 (enacted Dec. 10,
2015).
81 H.R. 2734, at § 9(a)(1) (defining “minor” as “an individual over the age of 12
and under the age of 16). This amendment distinguishes between a “child” and a
“minor,” with a “child” being an individual under the age of 13, as defined by the
parent statute COPPA (15 U.S.C. § 6501(1)).
82 H.R. 2734, at § 3(a) (stating that a parent must give verifiable parental
consent before an operator may collect a child’s personal information, and a minor
must give consent before the operator may collect the minor’s personal information).
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parents and children to eliminate personal information that
has been made available,83 and set forth enforcement
provisions for other agencies and states in addition to those
promulgated by the FTC.84 The Student Digital Privacy and
Parental Rights Act would prohibit operators from collecting
and selling a student’s information to a third party for a nonschool related purpose85 and give parents more control over
their child’s information.86 Most notably, this legislation would
require operators to publicly list what type of data they collect,
how it is used, and whether it is shared in a clear and easy-tounderstand manner.87 While these two attempts seem
promising, their track records and stagnant positions in
Congress seem to suggest that federal legislation may not be
the most efficient or welcome approach to protecting our
children from the threat of private-information collection and
use by third-party operators in the classroom.88
Congress successfully enacted a student-data privacy law in
2015, The Every Student Succeeds Act,89 but eliminated the
83 Id. at § 6(b)(1) (stating that no later than one year after the enactment of the
Act, the commission must promulgate a rule “to implement mechanisms that permit a
user . . . to erase or otherwise eliminate content or information submitted . . . that is
publicly available . . . and contains or displays personal information of children or
minors.”). Additionally, the operator must make users aware of the mechanism. Id.
84 Id. at § 7(b)–(c) (listing five other federal acts under which this Act may be
enforced and explaining the steps a state attorney general must take to enforce).
85 H.R. 2092, at §3(a).
86 Id. at § 3(c)(1) (stating that parents have the ability to directly authorize the
student’s information for non-educational purposes). Also, parents may request the
deletion of their child’s information that is not required by the school to be maintained.
Id. at § 3(b)(2).
87 Id. at § 3(b)(3).
88 The Do Not Track Kids Act of 2015 has not moved since its introduction and
assignment
to
committee.
See
Summary
H.R.
2734,
CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2734 (showing that the last
action took place on June 12, 2015). Additionally, the failed attempts in 2011 and 2013
provide little hope for this amendment’s enactment. See H.R. 3481 (113th): Do Not
Track Kids Act of 2013, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr3481; Summary
H.R. 1895, 112th Congress (2011–2012), https://www.congress.gov/bill/112thcongress/housebill/1895?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22%5C%22hr1895%5C%22%22%5D%7D&re
sultIndex=3. The Student Digital Privacy and Parental Rights Act of 2015 has also not
moved since being assigned to committee on May 1, 2015. See Summary: H.R. 2092,
114th Congress (2015–2016), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114thcongress/house-bill/2092/all-actions-withoutamendments?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22%5C%22hr
2092%5C%22%22%5D%7D&resultIndex=1.
89 Every Student Succeeds Act, 114 P.L. 95, 129 Stat. 1802 (enacted Dec. 10,
2015). The Act was enacted on December 10, 2015 to amend the Elementary and
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language directed at protecting interactions between students
and third-party operators.90 The bill originally seemed
promising in bringing improvements to student privacy at the
federal level through the creation of an enforcement
committee.91 Such a committee would have been the first major
step in enforcing the protections that laws like COPPA have let
slip through the cracks—such as ensuring proper parental
consent has been obtained. Because these extra classroom
privacy protections failed to make it into the final version of
the law, it seems that Congress is unwilling to address this
issue anytime soon. Failing to realize that technology will not
wait for the law to catch up will bring more harm and privacy
violations to those who deserve the most protection. Therefore,
in an effort to keep up with the technological advancements
and ensure a safer school environment, states should create
legislation specifically directed to online student interaction at
school.
III.

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN SCHOOLS AND COPPA

The applicability of COPPA to the school setting has been
unclear since its inception. Although the FTC seemed to
Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 6311. Id.
90 See Benjamin Herold, Student Data Privacy Mostly Missing in ESEA
Reauthorization, EDUCATION WEEK (Dec. 1, 2015, 12:23 PM). In its enacted form, the
Every Student Succeeds Act focuses more on a school’s accountability in ensuring
academic achievement. See Every Student Succeeds Act, 114 P.L. 95, 129 Stat. 1802
(2015); EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT: A
PROGRESS REPORT ON ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION (Dec. 2015). The
Every Student Succeeds Act does the following: ensures that states set high standards,
maintains accountability, empowers states and local decision-makers to develop their
own educational improvement systems, preserves annual assessments and reduces the
burden of erroneous and ineffective testing, provides more children access to highquality preschool, and establishes new resources to test teaching strategies and their
success. Id. at 1–2. Congress only addresses student privacy vaguely within the text,
with broad findings such as, “Students’ personally identifiable information is important
to protect;” “Students’ information should not be shared with individuals other than
school officials in charge of educating those students without clear notice to parents;”
and “With the use of more technology, and more research about student learning, the
responsibility to protect students’ personally identifiable information is more important
than ever.” Every Student Succeeds Act, at §§ 8545(a)(1)–(3).
91 See Lowdown on Federal Legislation 2015, supra note 76. Originally, the
legislation was to include the creation of a Student Privacy Committee for enforcement
and for clarifying unclear definitions, such as “third party” and “personal identifiable
information.” Federal Legislation Chart, supra note 77, at “ESEA Amendment” column.
The committee was to ensure that identifiable data could not be used for targeted
advertising or marketing and that a student’s data could be deleted upon request. Id.
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recognize the need for COPPA protection within schools, it
stated in its response to notice and comment and within its
Statement of Basis and Purpose that since “many schools
already seek parental consent for in-school Internet access . . .
the operator can presume that the school’s authorization is
based on the school’s having obtained the parent’s consent.”92
This creates an extra barrier for third-party operators in
gaining verifiable parental consent, and further begs the
question of whether the contractor must “double-check” the
school’s consent policies. Such a burden creates the uncertainty
of consistent COPPA enforcement. The burden should not be on
the operators alone—schools should have some of the
responsibility of ensuring the protection of their students’
privacy rights. With technology more prevalent than ever in
the classroom, measures should be taken to ensure both
protection of our most vulnerable citizens while in school and
protection of a parent’s right to give consent.
A. The FTC’s Unsettling Guidance to Schools: The Problem
with Allowing Schools to Give “Verifiable Parental
Consent”
In March 2015 the FTC released FAQs that specifically
address how schools can seek compliance with COPPA. Schools
must confirm that the services they use comply with federal
law, including COPPA for schools that teach children under
thirteen.93 Under COPPA, the FTC said that schools may act as
a parent’s agent in giving consent when the services are solely
for an educational purpose to benefit the school,94 and that the
operators of the educational online services may presume that
the school has reasonably obtained proper parental consent so
long as the student’s personal information is not used for
commercial purposes.95 While such guidance could be
considered reasonable, presuming that a school always
provides notice to parents and gains verifiable parental consent
before contracting with a new third party is unrealistic.
This is the main flaw with the FTC’s compliance guidance
for schools. Not only does it take control out of the hands of the

92
93
94
95

64 Fed. Reg. 59888, 59903 (Nov. 3, 1999).
Mutkoski, supra note 2, at 519.
2015 Guidance, supra note 21, at (M)(1).
Id. at (M)(2).
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parents, but it also places an extra burden on third party
contractors. The contractors must ensure that the consent
methods used by schools are “reasonably calculated” when
relying on the school as a proxy for parental consent.96 This
seems to take away responsibility from schools in protecting
the privacy of their students under the age of thirteen. Without
responsibility on the schools to uphold COPPA, collecting a
young child’s data while at school becomes easier, especially
when there is no careful oversight or parental involvement
required. Therefore, allowing schools to give “verifiable
parental consent” opens the door for many possible COPPA
violations.
Allowing a school to provide “verifiable parental consent” to
an online operator on behalf of a parent seems to be the most
efficient and least burdensome method to educate students in
the technological era. Having to inform every single parent of a
child under thirteen of all the collection and privacy disclosures
of every single application or website the child uses could waste
a great amount of time, energy, and resources. In addition, it is
likely that some parents will deny their child’s involvement,
arguably placing the child at an educational disadvantage.
Advocates for schools acting in loco parentis—”in the place of a
parent”—believe that “[requiring] one more administrative step
. . . saddles already overburdened educators and schools with
one more level of effort and is likely to further hinder the
delivery of effective online education.”97 However, exposing
young children’s personal information and surrendering their
parents’ ability to protect them can produce an even greater
harm.98 A desire for efficiency and a virtual classroom does not
outweigh the privacy rights of society’s youngest members and
the parental right of control.99
96 Id. However, if the operator intends to use the student’s data for other
commercial purposes, the operator must obtain actual parental consent. Id.
97 Hostetler & Okada, supra note 27, at 199.
98 See supra Part I.
99 According to a survey conducted from March 26, 2015 through April 2, 2015,
while the majority of parents are comfortable if their child’s data is collected solely for
the purpose of educational benefit, they generally disagree with the use of their child’s
personal data for commercial purposes. Beyond the Fear Factor, supra note 2, at 8.
Appropriate educational purposes that parents believe are okay to collect include
grades, attendance records, special needs status, standardized test scores, and
disciplinary records. Id. Most parents are comfortable with the child’s principal,
teachers, and schools using the information. Id. at 8–9 (showing that 89% of parents
are comfortable with their child’s principal and teachers having access to their child’s
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There are two major problems with a school giving
“verifiable parental consent” on behalf of the child’s parents.
First, it is difficult for the online operator to authenticate the
consent given by the school.100 Under COPPA, an online
operator must make sure that the school offering the parental
consent has used “reasonably calculated” methods to obtain
consent.101 The operator must ensure that the school is
providing authentic consent, not falsified consent such as a
child pretending to be a teacher.102 The second problem is
determining which school officials may provide the consent.103
The FTC recommends that the school district or individual
school be responsible for making the decision to use the
operator’s services and forming the contract.104 However, in
many cases it is the individual teachers who make such
decisions.105 From technological and legal standpoints, this may
not always be the best method.106
Without proper training and understanding, both school
districts and teachers may lack the expertise and knowledge of
the law required to make a completely informed decision, and
may enter into contracts with operators that are in violation of
COPPA.107 These decision makers may not know of the
required privacy and collection disclosures that operators must
provide, and may in turn fail to discover the operator’s true
collection purposes or fail to get additional parental consent if
so required.108 This is especially the case with free applications
information). However, most parents are not comfortable with companies that create
educational software, websites, and applications having access to their child’s data. Id.
(providing the statistic that only 42% of parents feel comfortable with companies that
create educational software, websites, and apps having access to their child’s
information).
100 Kelsey Finch, COPPA in the Classroom, THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
PRIVACY PROFESSIONALS (May 7, 2014), https://iapp.org/news/a/coppa-in-theclassroom/.
101 2015 Guidance, supra note 21, at (M)(2).
102 Id.
103 See Finch, supra note 100.
104 2015 Guidance, supra note 21, at (M)(3).
105 See Finch, supra note 100.
106 A recent survey conducted among 4,300 teachers found that 49% of teachers
believed that parents should have the smallest role in deciding what technology to use
in the classroom. Dian Schaffhauser, Teachers: We Want More Control over Ed Tech
Decisions,
THE
JOURNAL
(Dec.
16,
2015),
https://thejournal.com/articles/2015/12/16/teachers-we-want-more-control-over-ed-techdecisions.aspx.
107 See Finch, supra note 100; PBS NewsHour, supra note 5, beginning at 3:47.
108 A Fordham Law study published in 2013 found that “as a governance matter,
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since they are funded mostly through targeted marketing and
the collection of the user’s information.109 Additionally, the
operators’ presumption of “verifiable parental consent” when
contracting for educational purposes requires that they either
simply trust that the school acted accordingly with COPPA or
investigate the school’s methods, which seems highly
inconvenient and unlikely to occur.
If the school does indeed fail to comply with COPPA, it is
not the school that is most harmed or punished. It is the
children and parents who face harm to their rights, and the
operators that risk federal fines and punishment. Schools lack
any incentive to ensure compliance with COPPA. Without
uniform procedures laid out for schools to ensure enforcement,
the guessing game of whether actual “verifiable parental
consent” has been obtained will continue, as will the loss of
privacy rights for society’s most vulnerable members. With
failure on the federal level to ensure that “verifiable parental
consent” has been obtained, the best way to achieve a uniform
system of enforcement is through state law.
B. Examples of How States Are Responding
Since COPPA’s application to the school setting is still
unclear and fails to be adequately addressed at the federal
level, many states have begun enacting their own legislation to
fix the gaps between child privacy, parental consent, thirdparty operators, and the classroom. Because COPPA has a
state law preemption clause110 that prevents the states from
rewriting their own versions of COPPA, legislators are tasked

approximately 20% of the responding districts had no policies addressing teacher use of
information resources.” Joel Reidenberg et al., Privacy and Cloud Computing in Public
Schools, FORDHAM LAW SCHOOL CENTER ON LAW AND INFORMATION POLICY, 24 (Dec.
13, 2013), http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=clip
(finding that 95% of districts rely on cloud services for a variety of functions). In such
cases, the school administration has no oversight of the transfer of student
information. Id. The study provides the following example: “[I]f a school principal or
teacher decided to use a service such as Dropbox for students to share family photos,
the central administration would not have the opportunity to vet the terms and
conditions of the service and would not have the ability to ensure COPPA compliance.”
Id.
109 Tudor, supra note 3, at 311.
110 15 U.S.C. § 6502(d) (1998) (stating that “No State or local government may
impose any liability for commercial activities or actions by operators . . . in commerce
in connection with an activity or action described in this title that is inconsistent with
the treatment of those activities or actions under this section.”).
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with creating very narrow, school-specific, privacy legislation to
ensure that there is no conflict with the COPPA scheme.111
Some common approaches to state legislation include creating
unambiguous, school-specific language, increasing the level of
transparency between the third-party contractor and the
parent, and forming privacy task enforcement committees or
appointing officers to oversee compliance.
1. Unambiguous school-specific legislation
The most successful and strict piece of privacy legislation,
the Student Online Personal Information Protection Act
(SOPIPA),112 comes from California and has served as a model
for many other states.113 It focuses specifically on the
interactions of K–12 schools and online operators114 and
eliminates confusion over parental consent by providing
specific, all-inclusive prohibitions.115 Unlike federal legislation,
SOPIPA does not allow an operator to use the students’
information for any commercial purpose, so a convoluted
parental consent provision is not necessary.116 SOPIPA
prohibits targeted marketing, the creation of student profiles
for commercial purposes, and the sale of a student’s
information.117 It also requires that an operator “implement
and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices”
and “delete a student’s covered information if the school or
district requests deletion of data under the control of the school
or district.”118 California’s new law is the first of its kind and
has inspired other strict state legislation protecting the privacy
rights of young students, especially in states like Washington,
Utah, and Delaware.119

See COPPA +1: Issues and Impacts For Children’s Privacy, supra note 38.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22584 (2014).
113 See Tanya Roscorla, More States Pass Laws to Protect Student Data, CENTER
FOR DIGITAL EDUCATION (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.centerdigitaled.com/k-12/WhatStates-Did-with-Student-Data-Privacy-Legislation-in-2015.html?utm_source=related.
114 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22584(a).
115 See id., at (b).
116 See Id.
117 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22584 (b)(1)–(3).
118 Id. at (d).
119 See Roscorla, supra note 113.
111
112
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2. Increased transparency between third-party operators and
parents
Washington’s most recent student privacy law, The Student
User Privacy in Education Rights Act (SUPER Act),120
promotes a greater amount of transparency between the online
service providers and the schools. Specifically, the law requires
that the operators provide a clear and easy-to-understand
explanation about the types of information they collect, give
notice before making material changes to their privacy policies
for school services, and facilitate access to and correction of a
student’s personal information if so requested by the student,
parent, school, or teacher.121 Like COPPA, the SUPER Act only
allows the school to give consent on behalf of the parent for
educational purposes.122 Similar to SOPIPA, this law only
applies to student-oriented services, not to services that are
designed and marketed for individuals or entities generally.123
While the language found in COPPA creates confusion with
regard to “verifiable parental consent” and carries unclear
application to the school setting, the SUPER Act provides
specific school scenario-based guidance, leaving little room for
inconsistent application by the school and misunderstandings
of consent and notice responsibilities.124 With more
transparency and little room left for interpretation, a law like
this would likely be much easier to enforce. Having such
thorough requirements for transparency should be necessary to
ensure that all parties involved—schools, third-party operators,
parents, and even students—are aware of their responsibilities
and protections in such a new, emerging classroom interaction.
3. Privacy task enforcement officers/committees
Other states, like Utah, have taken a slightly different,

WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.604.010–.903 (2015).
Id. at § 28A.604.020(1)–(3).
122 Id. at § 28A.604.030(1). Parents retain full control when the operator desires
to use the student’s personal information for commercial purposes. Id.
123 Id. at § 28A.604.010 (1)(a); see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22584(a) (2014).
124 For example, Section 3 discusses the “Obligations of School Service
Providers—Transparency,” Section 4 discusses “Obligations of School Service
Providers—Choice and Control,” and Section 5 discusses “Obligations of School Service
Providers—Safeguards.” S.B. 5419, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 3–5. In addition, Section 6
discusses how the prohibitions apply to adaptive learning and customized education.
Id. at § 6.
120
121
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more enforcement-based approach.125 Until it was recently
repealed in May 2016, Utah’s law explicitly designated the
considerations of maintaining, securing, and safeguarding
student data to the state board of education. The state board of
education also provided disclosures to parents and students on
how the students’ data would be collected and used and
managed contracts with third-party service providers.126 This
scheme filled the inconsistent enforcement gap created by
COPPA and lessened the uncertainty of who is responsible for
ensuring the child’s privacy security while at school.
Additionally, the law created a “chief privacy officer,” who was
required to “oversee the administration of student privacy
laws” and “work with the board to develop funding proposals
and recommendations . . . .”127 Designating such enforcement
responsibilities to an entity whose sole job is privacy oversight
is likely the best method of improving the level of enforcement
and guaranteeing that a student’s personal information is not
collected and used inappropriately. In order to avoid the loss of
a child’s privacy rights due to lack of clear administrative
guidance, such privacy officers should be appointed on a wider
scale.
C. How States Should Respond: Prohibitive and
Governance Approaches
Even
though
statues
like
California’s
SOPIPA,
Washington’s SUPER Act, and Utah’s “chief privacy officer”
law are being enacted, not all fifty states have adopted such
student-data privacy legislation to govern online interactions in
the classroom.128 Since 2013, safeguarding student privacy has
emerged as top priority in nearly every state’s legislative

125 UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-1-711 (2015) (repealed by Laws 2016, c. 221, § 18, eff.
May 10, 2016 (H.B. 358), http://le.utah.gov/~2016/bills/static/HB0358.html). To access
the language of the repealed statute, see UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE,
http://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title53A/Chapter1/C53A-1-S711_2015051220150512.pdf.
126 UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE , UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-1-711(2)–(3) (2015),
http://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title53A/Chapter1/C53A-1-S711_2015051220150512.pdf.
127 Id. at § (4)(b).
128 Student Data Privacy Legislation: What Happened in 2015, and What is
Next?,
DATA
QUALITY
CAMPAIGN,
1
(Sept.
2015),
http://2pido73em67o3eytaq1cp8au.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/DQC-Student-Data-Laws-2015-Sept23.pdf,
(stating
that
twenty-one states passed student-data privacy laws in 2014 and fifteen states passed
student-data privacy laws in 2015).
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agenda.129 However, legislative proposals have differed greatly
among the states—particularly between prohibitive approaches
and governance approaches.130 A prohibitive approach “seeks to
ensure student privacy by preventing or halting the collection
of a certain type of data . . . or a certain data use . . . .”131 A
governance approach “seeks to amend or establish the
procedures (e.g., security audits, public lists of data collected),
roles and responsibilities (e.g., establishment of a chief privacy
officer, description of school board and legislature roles), and
supports (e.g., state leadership) needed to ensure that data are
used appropriately.”132 While each approach has proven to be
successful on its own, there is a higher chance (based on 2015
data) that a combined approach is more successful at reaching
enactment.133 One piece of legislation that seems to have
successfully combined these approaches is Delaware’s Student
Data Privacy Protection Act.134 For example, under the
prohibitive approach, the Act prohibits online service providers
that offer services for K–12 from selling student data, using
student data for target advertising, amassing a profile for noneducational purposes, and disclosing student data in a manner
not permitted by the Act.135 Under its governance approach, the
Act creates a “Student Data Privacy Task Force,” similar to
Utah’s, with an extremely detailed composition of members.136
129

Id. at 2. Common questions among legislators in 2015 included the following:

(a) how can schools use education technology, applications, and websites in
support of student learning while still safeguarding student privacy?; (b) how can
states best address the differences in the users and uses of data collected by the
district and data collected through the use of online services?; (c) how can states
best implement privacy laws and support their districts’ privacy policies and
activities?; and (d) how can states best develop privacy and data use policies that
address immediate questions and concerns and allow for responsive governance
decisions in the future?

Id.
130 Id. at 3 (stating that 125/182 proposed bills in 2015 were prohibitive in nature
(with 79/110 in 2014) and that 122/182 proposed bills in 2015 were governance based in
nature (with 52/110 in 2014)).
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 8 (showing that in 2015, while 15/125 prohibitive approach proposals
were signed into law and 24/122 governance approach proposals were signed into law,
11/73 proposals that combined the prohibitive and governance approaches became law).
134 Student Data Privacy Protection Act, S.B. 79, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Del. 2015) (amending 14 DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 8101A–8106A). With this law, the
legislature sought to balance a student’s educational opportunities without
compromising the privacy and security of the student’s information. Id. at “Synopsis.”
135 Id. at § 1 (amending 14 DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 8105A(1)–(4)).
136 Id. at § 3. The statute states:
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Like California, Delaware adopted legislation that creates allinclusive prohibitions, thereby removing the confusion created
by a commercial collection parental consent requirement.
States that lack sufficient student data privacy laws should
follow the combined approach taken by Delaware to ensure
both that harmful actions by third-party operators are
prohibited and that efficient measures are in place at schools to
monitor compliance.
For example, one such state that is in need of adequate
student-data privacy laws is Tennessee.137 The current law in
Tennessee, enacted in 2014, only expands protection for
information within a school educational record, failing to
address the classroom interactions between schools and thirdparty operators.138 Failure to have a uniform law across the
state leads to a patchwork of inconsistent district policies,
which in turn leads to different protections for students based
on district. For example, the Williamson County School District
implemented the BYOT initiative, or “Bring Your Own
Technology” initiative during the 2012–2013 school year.139
The Task Force is composed of the Attorney General, the Secretary of Education,
the President of the State Board of Education, the Secretary of the Department of
Technology and Information, the Chief of the State School Officers Association, the
President of the Delaware School Boards Association, the President of the
Delaware Charter Schools Network, the President of the Delaware State
Education Association, and the President of the Delaware Congress of Parents &
Teachers, Inc., or their respective designees, and two representatives from
companies, trade associations, or groups which operate in the area of student data
privacy or online educational technology services, appointed by the Chairs of the
Education Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives.

Id.
137 Based on a 2012 survey conducted on seventy public Tennessee schools whose
students used personal devices in the classroom, 43% of the participating schools used
PC laptops, 22% used Apple iPads, 17% used netbooks, 12% used Apple Mac laptops,
and about 6% used some other form of electronic device in the classroom. Doug Wright,
Digital Textbooks in K-12 Schools, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND EDUCATION
ACCOUNTABILITY, TENNESSEE COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY, JUSTIN P. WILSON, at
3–4
n.
F
(Oct.
2013),
http://www.comptroller.tn.gov/Repository/RE/Digital%20Textbooks.pdf (citing a survey
conducted by the Technology in Education Survey System at the Center for Research in
Education
Policy
at
the
University
of
Memphis,
http://www.crepsurveys.net/TESS/StateUserHomepage.jsp?public=1 (accessed Sept. 25,
2013)). While Tennessee recently enacted an education law in 2014, it does not address
the interactions between schools and third-party operators. See H.B. 1549, 108th Gen.
Assemb. (Tenn. 2013).
138 See T.C.A. § 49-1-703 (2014).
139 See WILLIAMSON COUNTY SCHOOLS, INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGY: BYOT
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (Mar. 8, 2012) [hereinafter
BYOT
Q&A],
http://www.wcs.edu/wp-content/pdf/InstructionalTechnology/BYOTQA.pdf.
This
program allows students in grades 3–12 to either bring a portable electronic device

Peddy.125-159.docx (Do Not Delete)

152

B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL

1/23/17 11:25 AM

[2017

Under this program, each student is assigned a Gmail email
account and uses Google Docs140—a type of cloud computing
that requires interaction with online service providers. Such a
program is exactly the type that requires the protection of laws
like COPPA, SOPIPA, the SUPER Act, or Delaware’s Student
Data Privacy Protection Act. Since the state of Tennessee has
not passed any legislation guiding the school districts in such a
manner, the Williamson County school district itself created its
own policies to govern the BYOT initiative.141 While these
policies are strict and require great levels of school monitoring,
they differ from other school districts—like Shelby County
School District. The Shelby County policies provide a more
exhaustive list of the actions that can and cannot be taken by
students and other users generally.142 Williamson County is
more governance based while Shelby County is more
prohibition based. On its face, it seems that the Shelby County
School District offers more protections for students than the
Williamson County School District. If states in similar
situations want to provide uniform protection for all school
children and avoid a patchwork of inconsistent district policies,
with full Internet capabilities or check out a device owned by the school in order to
enhance classroom learning—including smartphones, iPads and tablets, iPods, laptops,
netbooks, and eReaders. Id.; see also WILLIAMSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
ACCEPTABLE USE, MEDIA RELEASE, AND INTERNET SAFETY PROCEDURES, at 6
[hereinafter WILLIAMSON INTERNET SAFETY PROCEDURES], http://www.wcs.edu/wpcontent/pdf/BoardPolicies/4406p.pdf.
140 BYOT Q&A, supra note 139.
141 According to the district’s “Acceptable Use, Media Release, and Internet
Safety Procedures,” students must remain connected to the Williamson County School’s
guest network at all times in order to be monitored by teachers for safety reasons.
WILLIAMSON INTERNET SAFETY PROCEDURES, supra note 139, at 2. As long as the child
is connected to the district’s network, the district is able to restrict and filter the
information that the student is allowed to access. Id. Additionally, the district reserves
the right to collect and examine a student’s device if there is a reasonable suspicion
that the student is violating school policy or the law. Id.
142 See Student Access Release and Authorization Form, SHELBY COUNTY BOARD
OF
EDUCATION,
http://www.scsk12.org/schools/whitestation.ms/site/documents/StudentInternetAgreem
ent.pdf. For example, the policy states, “Students shall not transmit personally
identifiable or personal contact information about themselves or others, except the
student’s e-mail address, without prior consent by the parent and the teacher.
Personally identifiable or personal contact information shall include name, address,
telephone number, photograph, social security number, school name, and classroom.”
Id. at 4. Additionally, the policy states, “The [Memphis City Schools (MCS)] network
may be used only for educational and professional purposes consistent with the MCS’s
goals. Commercial use (advertisements, business logos, etc.) of the MCS network is
prohibited, unless specifically permitted in writing by the Department of
Communications.” Id. at 5.
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then they should adopt legislation that both expressly prohibits
potentially harmful actions by third-party operators and
provides rules of governance, which school districts must follow
in order to ensure that each student is protected. Since federal
attempts have failed to provide adequate protection for
students in these situations, a combined prohibitiongovernance approach is likely the best method of ensuring data
privacy protections at the state level.
IV.

PROPOSED STATUTORY APPROACH FOR STATES

The best approach for a state in constructing new
legislation is to implement unambiguous guidelines, clear
prohibitions, and a workable governance plan.143 The ultimate
goal, as executed in Washington,144 should be not only to ensure
a student’s privacy protection while interacting online in the
classroom, but also to create a level of transparency for all
parties—students, schools, third-party operators, and
parents.145 All parties should be aware of the rights afforded to
students, the prohibited behaviors of a third-party operator,
and the enforcement responsibilities of the school. Therefore, in
order to avoid a COPPA-like situation where it is unclear when
consent is needed, who may give consent, and who is
responsible for double-checking that consent has been properly
obtained, the following proposals will provide strict guidelines,
leaving no room for such questioning. A state statute following
this prohibitive-governance approach will likely create
uniformity in states with a patchwork of varying district
policies.
143 See Student Data Privacy Legislation: What Happened in 2015, and What is
Next?, supra note 128, at 3; see also Mutkoski, supra note 2, at 530–32 (discussing the
best practices that should be implemented in educational institutions for cloud
computing practices).
144 See S.B. 5419, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 3–5 (Wash. 2015). For example,
Washington’s SUPER Act states, “School service providers shall provide clear and easy
to understand information about the types of student personal information they collect
and about how they use and share the student personal information,” and “School
service providers must obtain consent before using student personal information in a
manner that is materially inconsistent with the school service provider’s privacy policy
or school contract for the applicable school service in effect at the time of collection.” Id.
at §§ 3(1), 4(5).
145 Most parents do not know what the student data privacy laws entail,
therefore, creating transparency is critical. See Beyond the Fear Factor, supra note 2, at
14 (finding that 54% of parents “do not know anything about federal laws that restrict
what public schools can do with their child’s information.”).
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A. Prohibitive Proposals
One way to eliminate ambiguous interpretation is through
clearly-worded guidelines and prohibitions. Because this
proposal deals exclusively with the interactions between
students and third-party operators, creating complete
prohibitions allows for easy enforceability. Such unambiguous
language will not only make the restrictions understandable,
but it will also create transparency so all parties involved know
what to expect for a legal, online classroom interaction to occur.
The following provisions should be included in a state’s
legislative proposal or amendment in order to ensure that a
child receives complete protection from illegal collection of
personal information, sale of personal information, or identity
theft while using classroom applications in school.
1. “In a K–12 institution,146 no operator shall knowingly engage
in targeted advertising, sell a student’s information, or use a
student’s personal information147 for any purpose other than the
educational purpose for which the operator was contracted,
unless disclosure is made for reasons required by law or court
order.”
Prohibitions should be straightforward and should not
provide opportunities for evasion.148 This provision does not
allow an operator to engage in any commercial purposes while
providing services to students within a school, offering absolute
protection for students. This absolute prohibition also
eliminates any of the previous confusion caused by the need to
obtain “verifiable parental consent” so that the operator may
engage in commercial activities.149 A list of exceptions would
146 Instead of imitating COPPA, state legislators should make the law applicable
to all students in elementary through high school. This age range promotes not only
equal protections for all minor students, but also uniformity with other existing
education privacy laws, thus eliminating any kind of confusion.
147 The definition of “personal information” should mirror that found in
Delaware’s law, including not only a list of physical information—such as residential
address—but also the different ways in which “personal information” is created, such
as through an online profile created by the student while using the operator’s service.
See Student Data Privacy Protection Act, S.B. 79, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. at §
8102(A)(16) (Del. 2015).
148 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22584 (2014). SOPIPA does not include an
extensive list of exceptions, as seen in COPPA (15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(2)), thus making
clarity and enforceability difficult.
149 See supra Part III(A).
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leave states with the same problems that already exist under
federal law. Forming such a strict and specific law will prevent
both inconsistent interpretation and potential violations of
student privacy.
2. No operator shall refuse to delete a student’s information if
the student or the student’s parent requests the removal of such
information from the operator’s control.
Borrowing from the proposed Do Not Track Kids Act of
2015, this proposed provision creates an “eraser button” to
allow a student’s personal information to be deleted upon
request.150 Such an option gives not only the student control
over his or her information, but also allows parents to exercise
their right of parental control over their minor child’s
interactions. Having an “eraser button” requirement ensures
that only operators with non-commercial intentions that are
willing to leave control in the hands of the students and their
parents are allowed to contract with schools for interactive
classroom purposes.
3. Any third-party operator that wishes to contract with a
school for educational purposes must disclose all collection
policies. School districts must approve the operator’s collection
policies before the operator may engage with the students.
This provision draws from The Student Digital Privacy and
Parental Rights Act of 2015, which requires operators to
publicly list what type of data they collect, how it is used, and
whether it is shared in a clear and easy-to-understand
manner.151 Making such policies available to schools before any
contract agreement is entered into is the best way for the
school to prevent the possibility of any privacy violations. In
addition, it provides the greatest amount of transparency, not
only between the school and the third-party operator, but also
between the third-party operator and parents since the school
must also relay the operator’s collection policies to the
150 See H.R. 2734, 114th Congress, at § 6(b)(1) (2015–2016) (stating that no later
than one year after the enactment of the Act, the commission must promulgate a rule
“to implement mechanisms that permit a user . . . to erase or otherwise eliminate
content or information submitted . . . that is publicly available . . . and contains or
displays personal information of children or minors.”). Additionally, the operator must
make users aware of the mechanism. Id.
151 H.R. 2092, 114th Cong. at § 3(b)(3) (2015).
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parents.152 Having clear-cut guidelines and prohibitions is
likely the most effective way to eliminate ambiguous
interpretations.
B. Governance proposals
Governance and enforcement procedures are also crucial in
ensuring that the protective measures in place remain
effective. Since the students’ interactions with the operators
take place within the classroom, it is logical that the majority
of enforcement responsibilities should fall on the school. Unlike
COPPA, which makes it the responsibility of a third-party
operator to ensure that proper consent is obtained, this
proposal requires that the school take extra preventative
measures to ensure that violations are avoided. Involving
schools heavily in governance is the best way to create
transparency and keep operators in check. Because parents
already entrust schools with their child’s physical safety,
trusting schools with children’s online safety is not an
unrealistic expectation. States should consider the following
provisions to improve their enforcement methods and keep
their new restrictions effective.
1. The Board of Education shall establish a Student Data
Privacy Task Force to research and make recommendations
regarding the development and execution of current student
data privacy laws and policies.
Creation of an enforcement task force is another way in
which schools can ensure that their students are receiving
adequate protection. Like Delaware and Utah, states should
create a privacy task force specifically designated to oversee
school district compliance with state law and the school’s
specific privacy policies.153 The purpose of the task force is “to
study and make findings and recommendations regarding the
development and implementation of a comprehensive
framework to govern the privacy, protection, accessibility, and
use of student data within and as part of the State’s public
See infra Part IV(B)(2)(3).
See Student Data Privacy Protection Act , S.B. 79, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. § 3 (Del. 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-1-711 (2015) (repealed by Laws 2016, c.
221,
§
18,
eff.
May
10,
2016
(H.B.
358),
http://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title53A/Chapter1/C53A-1-S711_2015051220150512.pdf).
152
153
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education system.”154 Creating a task force removes the
enforcement burden from teachers and school administrators
who have other administrative duties to uphold. Each member
of the task force must be properly educated and trained in
technology and privacy law before holding a position.
Legislators should look to Delaware’s Student Data Privacy
Protection Act to determine what individuals may best suit the
position.155 With a designated enforcement task system in
place, schools can seek to ensure that their students are better
protected.
2. Any teacher or school administrator who intends to allow
students to access an online service for educational purposes
while at school must participate in a certified student-data
privacy course at least once a year.
Without proper training and understanding, both school
districts and teachers may lack the expertise and knowledge of
the law required to make a completely informed decision, and
may enter into contracts with operators that are in violation of
relevant student-data privacy law.156 Since it is usually
individual teachers who make the initial decision to use an
operator’s services,157 it would be highly irresponsible if the
decision-maker selected a service without ensuring the proper
protections are in place. Therefore, any legislative effort
presented by states should require teachers to participate in a
mandatory student privacy course at least once a year.
3. Any teacher or school administrator who intends to allow
students to access an online service for educational purposes
while at school must provide parents with the operator’s
collection policies and receive consent prior to the introduction
of the online service to the students in the classroom for its use.
This provision stems from the basic notion that parents
should maintain control over their child’s interactions. If a
parent thinks that a particular activity may be harmful to his
or her child’s privacy, that parent should have the ability to
154 Student Data Privacy Protection Act, S.B. 79, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
§ 3 (Del. 2015).
155 See Id.
156 See Finch, supra note 100.
157 See id.
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disallow the child’s participation.158 Creating a provision that
keeps parents abreast of an operator’s collection policies is one
of the most obvious ways of promoting transparency.
4. Each teacher or school administrator who engages students
in online classroom interactions must keep a current log—that
includes all services a student interacts with and the thirdparty operator’s collection policies—in the event a parent or
other authorized school administrator requests review of a
student’s interactions.
This provision seeks to create complete transparency
between third-party operators, schools, and parents. Allowing
for a quick reference is extremely helpful in both keeping track
of the risks a student may face and for an inspection by an
enforcement task force. Maintaining a log of all the services
students use enhances the school’s ability to closely govern the
interactions between operators and students. By following
these suggested guidelines, individual states will be able to fill
the gaps left in the relationship between third-party
contractors, students, parents, and schools. Such legislation
will ensure that a child receives better protection from the
illegal actions by third-party operators while using classroom
applications in school.
V.

CONCLUSION

Students must be protected from unwanted and illegal
collection of their personal information. Although using
technology is a great way for teachers to track student progress
and to prepare students for their future technology-driven
lives, it produces both risk for potential harm and places a
greater level of responsibility on a school to protect its
students. Current federal legislation (including COPPA) and
recent federal legislative attempts have failed to adequately
provide clear guidance for interactions between third-party
providers and students in the classroom. Unfortunately, such
federal laws are extremely confusing, difficult to apply, and are
not strictly enforced, which has led to a heightened risk of
158 See generally Every Student Succeeds Act, 114 P.L. 95, 129 Stat. 1802 § (e)(2)
(2015) (providing that parents may opt their child out of testing). This new federal law
demonstrates that parents should still have control over their child’s education.
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student privacy violations in the classroom. All states—
particularly ones without laws governing classroom
interactions—should adopt prohibitive and governance
provisions to promote 1) an absolute, unambiguous protection
of student privacy, 2) greater responsibility on schools for
enforcement, and 3) transparency amongst third-party
operators, schools, students, and parents. With the guidance
and enforcement policies in the hands of the states, the risk of
illegal collection and use of students’ personal information will
become more manageable.
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